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POST-MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING
BY JAMES S. ROUTCH*
The testator's death does not necessarily terminate the opportunity to
make plans that can result in financial advantages to his estate and thereby
the beneficiaries. Rather, the modern estate planner may undo what seem-
ingly were good testamentary estate plans or, to the extent possible, correct
poorly conceived plans. This re-evaluation in an effort to obtain the maxi-
mum tax benefits is called "Post-Mortem Estate Planning." Therefore, a
basic understanding and awareness of the methods available and goals to be
achieved in effecting this plan are essential for the skillful administration
of the decedent's estate.
Basically, two primary goals can be achieved by after death planning.
First, selecting the proper course of action can result in an immediate tax
benefit to the estate and/or the beneficiaries, or well considered planning
may create a status that makes possible tax savings beyond the immediate tax
consequences.' Secondly, a post-mortem plan may be used to thaw benefits
which have become frozen or unduly restricted; powers of appointment may
be exercised to adapt distribution plans to current needs; and ways to safe-
guard investments of widows and children can be devised.2  To achieve
these results, the following methods for effectuating an overall post-mortem
plan should be given consideration by the executor and/or attorney. The
impact of any plan should be examined in the following areas of the tax law:
(1) Estate-Tax, (2) Income Tax, and (3) The Inter-relation between the
Estate Tax and Income Tax.
ESTATE TAX CONSIDERATIONS
At least five different methods of effecting a post-mortem estate plan
have a direct effect upon the estate tax. First, and probably foremost because
of its impact on the all-important marital deduction, is the ELECTION TO
TAKE AGAINST THE WILL.3 Estate tax savings may be realized
through utilization of the election where the intended marital deduction fails
to qualify because one of the five statutory requirements is lacking, or if for
any other reason the value of property interest passing to the surviving
spouse falls short of the maximum marital deduction available. 4 Thus,
* A.B., Dickinson College; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law; Assistant Attorney
General, Bureau of Sales and Use Tax, Pennsylvania Department of Revenue. The
opinions of the author do not necessarily represent those of the Commonwealth.
1. Price, Post-Mortem Estate Planning, 15th N. Y. U. INST. ON FED. TAXATION
1029 (1957).
2. Magnusson, Postdeath Estate Planning, 40 IOWA L. Rv. 572 (1955).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.8(a) (1956). For an excellent article concerning
a related but significantly different type of election see Westfall, Estate Planning and
the Widows Election, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1269 (1958).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
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where decedent's will places all his estate in trust for his surviving spouse
but does not give her any powers which will allow the trust to qualify as the
marital deduction, the income produced by the trust exceeds the spouse's
needs, and there is a desire to transfer some of the income to the children-
remaindermen of the trust without adverse tax consequences to the spouse,
election against the will produces a twofold result. On the one hand, this
statutory share which passes outright to the spouse under Pennsylvania law
constitutes an interest passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse, 5
qualifies for the marital deduction and may be used to reduce the estate tax.6
On the other hand, the balance, which would be one-half or two-thirds,
7
would pass to the children immediately without any tax consequences to the
spouse.8 This will reduce income which might have been included in the
spouse's gross income and provide income for the possible needs of the
children. Although the share passing to the spouse will be taxable at her
death, its amount has been greatly reduced and may be further reduced by
a judicious use of principal during the spouse's lifetime, or by inter vivos
gift. As a result financial as well as practical benefits can be derived by use
of the election to take against the will.9
Although not within the realm of post-mortem planning, a problem
which must be considered because of its possible effects on the marital
and charitable deduction is the possibility of shifting interests stemming from
WILL CONTESTS and COMPROMISES. The effect upon the marital
deduction by a shifting of interests as the result of a will contest is not
covered by the Code, but is treated only in the regulations.", Generally, if
the contest results, whether by court decision or settlement, in the surrender
of a property interest by the surviving spouse, the interest so surrendered
is considered as having never passed to such spouse and, therefore, cannot
5. INT. REV. 'CODE OF 1954, § 2056(e) (3).
6. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(c).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.8(b) (1947).
8. It must be borne in mind that the property interests passing to the surviving
spouse by reason of the election can qualify only if all other conditions of the marital
deduction provisions are met: Treas. Reg. 105 § 81.47a(f). In states, therefore, where
the election gives the surviving spouse only a common-law dower or curtesy interest,
such an interest, being terminable, will not qualify. Cf. Rev. Rul. 279, 1953-2 CuM.
BULL. 275.
9. The preceding example, results achieved, and consequences thereof, is taken
from Price, supra note 1 at 1049, 1050. For additional examples, see Rodgers and
Sterling, Post-Mortem Estate Planning, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 224, 229 (1953). In regard
to the question of whether or not the surviving spouse's distributive share is to be
determined before or after deducting the federal estate tax see 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 236
(1958); Magnusson, supra note 2; and Pennsylvania Apportionment Act of 1951, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §§ 881-887 (1951) ; Hagey Estate, 8 Pa. Fiduciary Rep. 301 (1958).
But see Babcock v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956) and In re Clark's Estate,
8 Pa. D. & C.2d 665 (1958) where a contrary result was reached in regard to the
Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax.
10. Treas. Reg. 105 § 81.47a(g).
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qualify. But, if the contest results in the assignment or surrender of an
interest to the surviving spouse, it will be deemed to have passed to the
spouse only if the surrender or assignment was a bona fide recognition of
enforceable rights in the decedent's estate." Of somewhat lesser significance
is the effect of the will contest or compromise on the charitable deduction and
state inheritance taxes. In applying their local inheritance taxes, most states
have adopted one of two conflicting approaches. In a minority of jurisdic-
tions, including Pennsylvania, the tax is based upon the actual distribution
under the terms of a bona fide compromise. 1 2 However, the majority imposes
inheritance taxes based on the terms of the will except in those jurisdictions
which allow the actual distribution to be controlling if based on a court deci-
sion of a litigated will contest.13 Thus the inheritance tax results vary not
only from state to state but even within a state, depending upon what for-
malities are observed. In regard to property swelling the charitable deduc-
tion, the federal courts have avoided this technical morass. 14 If the person
or institution contesting the will has a legitimate standing to do so, the
charitable deduction is measured by what the charity actually gets.'5 This
approach is now embodied in the regulations 16 and rulings.17
The third method of post-mortem estate planning, a DISCLAIMER
OR RENUNCIATION implies and has been defined, as a complete and
unqualified refusal to accept property to which one is entitled.,' This should
be distinguished from an election which implies a choosing between two or
11. Ibid. A bona fide recognition will be presumed where a local court has rendered
a decision on the merits in an adversary proceeding. Consent decrees or settlement
agreements not to contest or not to probate a will will not necessarily be recognized.
See Estate of Gertrude P. Barrett, 22 T.C. 606 (1954) where the Court recognized as
qualifying for the marital deduction a settlement payment made to the surviving husband
to compromise his claim to a share in the estate where it found that the settlement
was made in good faith as a result of arms' length bargaining. See INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 2056(d).
12. In re Taber's Estate, 257 Pa. 81, 101 Atl. 311 (1917).
13. The cases on the state tax effects of will compromises are collected and
reviewed in Black, The Effect of Renunciations and Compromises on Death and Gift
Taxes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 241 (1950) ; Tye, Tax Status of Will Compromise Agreements,
19 TAXES 350 (1941).
14. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938). Although the case was concerned with
income taxes, its holding has been carried over and applied in the field of estate and
gift taxes.
15. Thompson's Estate v. Comm'r, 123 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Nicholas Murray
Butler, 18 T.C. 914 (1952) ; Estate of M. Falk, 18 T.C. 699 (1952).
16. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(c).
17. Rev. Rul. 145, 1953 INT. REV. BULL. No. 16, at 35. The preceding analysis and
discussion regarding will contests is noted and further treated in 2 LASSER, ESTATE TAX
TECHNIQUES 2197 (1957).
18. No gift tax liability results from a bona fide compromise. Lyeth v. Hoey,
supra note 14. But see Houseman v. Comm'r, 105 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. den.,
309 U.S. 656 (1940).
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more alternatives or choosing to do or not to do some act, 19 and a compromise
which implies giving up of something owned or controlled for something.
20
A disclaimer or renunciation should also be distinguished from a release
or relinquishment 2' which implies a giving up of something owned or con-
trolled or a transfer, since the latter normally attracts a gift tax 22 unless
within an express statutory exception.23 Before considering the use of any
disclaimer, the following factors should be considered: (1) will the proposed
disclaimer be effective under local law,24 (2) to whom will the disclaimed
property pass;25 (3) particular situations in which a disclaimer may be
utilized advantageously tax-wise;26 and (4) tax consequences thereof. Be-
fore discussing the tax consequences, certain non-tax factors merit important
consideration. Thus the state of health, life expectancy and independent
means of the surviving spouse may be the operative facts of any final deter-
mination. And where an heir, devisee, or legatee is involved, the real need
for diverting possible dispositions to alleviate a resulting high tax bracket,
plus the existence of younger persons to whom property might pass with a
consequent saving in income taxes and postponement of possible estate tax
liability in the near future, may be controlling in the final analysis.
With this in mind, some relevant gift tax considerations should be noted.
The question of gift tax treatment of refusals by heirs or legatees to accept
legacies or property from a decedent has proved to be troublesome. The
19. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1. Various aspects of disclaimers are discuseed in the
following articles: Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U. L. REV. 568
(1953) ; Roehner, Renunciation as Taxable Gift, 8 TAX L. REv. 289 (1953) ; Note,
Disclaimers in Federal Taxation, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1043 (1950) ; Benjamin, Effective
Renunciation of Succession in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REv. 81 (1951) ; Ward, Practical
Aspects of Disclaimers by Donees, Heirs and Legatees, 16th N. Y. U. INST. ON FED.
TAXATION 1937 (1958); Smith, Property and Tax Consequences of Renunciation and
Disclaimers, 96 TRUST & ESTATES 744 (1957).
20. An election not to exercise a power of appointment may result in a gift tax.
NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(e). In regard to a widow who elects not to claim
against her husband's will which gives her less than her statutory rights, see Estate of
Selina J. Gray, 14 T.C. 390 (1950) ; The Chase National Bank v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 617
(1955), noted in 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 30 (1957) ; Seigel v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 743
(1956). Where a creditor permits the statute of limitations to run without attempting
to enforce his claim see Estate of Eleanor J. Beggs, 13 T.C. 131 (1949).
21. The Code recognizes a distinction between the renunciation and release. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2041 (a) (2) and § 2514(b).
22. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2. See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2035 (relinquish-
ment in contemplation of death).
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
24. For methods of disclaimer see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.3(b) (1947).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(9) et seq.
26. The most obvious situation which frequently arises is that in which the
surviving spouse's potential estate overruns the marital deduction. Other situations
involve, but are not limited to, powers of appointment, charitable bequests, and trust
benefits. See 2 Lasser, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES 2197 (1957).
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proposed regulations,27 following the distinction made by several courts, 28
stated that a renunciation of a vested property interest, where title imme-
diately vested under local law in the devisee or heir at decedent's death, was
a taxable gift. Renunciation where title did not immediately vest under
local law was not a gift if all the property was renounced within a reasonable
time. Thus in the case of intestate inheritance, the disclaiming party sub-
jects himself to a gift tax.2 The renunciation of a testamentary benefit or
legacy, however, incurs no gift tax unless there is no residuary clause and the
disclaiming party is the sole intestate heir.30 This results in a descent of the
disclaimer's interest in favor of his children, the disclaimer being ineffective
as to the intestate rights and operating as an acceptance of these rights and
an assignment of them with consequent gift tax liability.31 In regard to
partial disclaimer, the regulations explicitly state that a disclaimer of only a
portion of the property to which one is entitled is not a complete and un-
qualified refusal within the meaning of the regulations.32 But a renunciation
of one or more of several bequests, which are in fact separate, is a complete
disclaimer and will not attract a gift tax, even though all the gifts are con-
tained in a single instrument or in a single paragraph of the instrument.3 3
This was the status of the law prior to 1958 when the release of the final
estate and gift tax regulations for the 1954 Code occurred. 34  The final
regulations avoid the use of the terms "devisee," "renunciation," or "vest-
ing."'35 Instead, they state there is no gift if by local law the beneficiary or
heir or next-of-kin may completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept owner-
ship of the property, and does so. Whether the transfer is effected by will
or intestacy is immaterial. There is a gift only if local law does not permit
such a refusal, or does not allow the beneficiary or heir to prevent himself
from becoming owner of the property. While there has been no litigation
concerning the effect of these new regulations, it is felt they will abolish
the archaic distinction between "vested" and "non-vested" property rights
for renunciation purposes.386
27. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c), 22 Fed. Reg. 58 (1957). Kay, Renunciations, Dis-
claimers, and Releases, 35 TAXES 767 (1957).
28. Lowndes & Kramer, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GirT TAXES (1956). See cases
collected at 682-83.
29. Hardenberg v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. den., 344 U.S. 836
(1952); Maxwell v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
30. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. den., 290 U.S. 641
(1933).
31. Maxwell v. Comm'r, supra note 29.
32. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511.1.
33. Brown v. Routzahn, supra note 30.
34. See Lowndes, Summary and Analysis of Final Estate Tax Regulations, 97
TRUSTS & ESTATES 708, 787 (1958) ; Rodman, New Estate Tax Regulations on Estates
of Nonresidents not Citizens, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 712 (1958).
35. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
36. Frankel, What To Do About Renunciation Of Bequests And Related Problems,
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With these gift tax consequences in mind, the following estate tax
considerations should also be borne in mind. When planning to utilize the
disclaimer and the marital deduction, it should be remembered that property
which passes to a widow by reason of a third party's disclaimer does not
qualify for the marital deduction. The reason is that the renounced property
is considered, for purposes of the marital deduction,37 to have passed from
the decedent to the claimant and then to the widow, regardless of local law
concepts.38 Yet, a surviving spouse's disclaimer will reduce the allowable
marital deduction since the renounced property is considered, for purposes
of the marital deduction, to pass from the decedent directly to the person
benefiting from the disclaimer.3 9 As a result, where more property qualifies
for the marital deduction than can be utilized, it may be possible to reduce
the amount qualifying by renunciation. But this can only be intelligently
decided after first determining the gift tax consequences. Thus, renunciation
of a surviving spouse's legacy results in no gift tax40 and may be used effec-
tively for tax as well as non-tax benefits.4 1
When made prior to the date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax
return, an irrevocable disclaimer of an interest, which thereby falls into any
bequest, legacy, devise or transfer to a charitable organization, will be allow-
able as a charitable deduction.42 Thus, a renunciation of the power to invade
the corpus of a trust, which would otherwise disqualify a remainder interest
for the charitable deduction will make a charitable deduction possible and
enlarge it, depending upon the restrictions in the instrument pertaining to the
2 Lasser, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES 2190 (1959). The test of the final regulations seems
more satisfactory and not so strictly confined to technical concepts of property law as
that of the proposed regulations. Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 34 N. Y.
U. L. REv. 213, 229 (1959).
37. The rules on how property is considered to pass after a renunciation are
expressly limited to the determination of what marital deduction is allowable. Con-
sequently a third party's renunciation in favor of a surviving spouse is not thereby
necessarily making a taxable gift to the spouse. The general principles heretofore dis-
cussed will determine this.
38. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(d) (2).
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(d) (1).
40. Brown v. Routzahn, supra note 30.
41. For example, suppose decedent's will granted a life estate to the surviving
spouse with remainder over to children and grandchildren. The surviving spouse may
have come from a long-lived family and be in excellent health. If the surviving spouse
should live to be a very old age, it might be years before the children or grandchildren
would receive any economic benefit from the remainder interests. The benefits are
frozen during the lifetime of the surviving spouse. In order to prevent this freezing of
benefits, renunciation by the spouse will operate to accelerate the remainder interests un-
less a contrary intent is shown in the will. Magusson, supra note 2, at 576. If the sur-
viving spouse does not wish to give substantial assets outright immediately nor terminate
the trust, disclaimer of the income from the life estate is possible if no acceleration results
by operation of law. Thus trust income accruing subsequent to renunciation will not be
taxable to her. See First Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 828 (1939).
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055.
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invasion privilege.43 As a result, the estate tax is reduced and the amount of
corpus earning income for the life tenant is correspondingly increased. Re-
nunciation should only be seriously considered where it is unlikely that resort
to principal will be necessary. Otherwise, practical considerations would
probably outweigh tax considerations in this area.
It should also be noted that although the estate of a legatee who died
subsequent to the testator might benefit if the legatee renounced, it would
appear that the executor of the legatee's estate would have no right to dis-
claim," unless conferred directly by statute.45 Further, a disclaimer of a
general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942 may result in
favorable tax consequences since a disclaimer attracts no gift tax liability.46
A fourth and equally important, as well as effective, post-mortem estate
planning method is involved through the use of the ALTERNATE VALU-
ATION DATE. An investment hedge can be obtained by the estate since
the executor is afforded the option to value assets for estate tax purposes
either on the date of death or one year later.47 Thus, as explained by one
writer, the United States Treasury assumes the economic burden of the loss
in a proportion equal to the estate tax bracket of the estate. It does not
share, on the other hand, in any gain due to appreciation of investments so
far as estate taxes are concerned. 48 Hence, in selecting a valuation date, the
following should be considered: (1) It may be advantageous, not to sell
sound investments that have potential appreciation, especially where the
immediate conversion to cash will most likely cause a rather substantial loss
of income ;49 (2) Where there is a small taxable estate, or, due to the allow-
able deductions, no taxable estate, such election might be appropriate where
the estate tax on the increased value at the later valuation date is lower than
the income tax which would be applicable to a gain realized on a later sale
of the assets, or where the deductible depreciation on the higher basis of the
assets will thereafter be advantageous;50 (3) Since, under Sections
2032(b) (2) and 2056, the amount of the marital deduction is determined
with regard to the valuation date, the election of the higher value may have
43. Estate of Ida F. Doane, 10 T.C. 1258 (1948).
44. In re Howe's Estate, 112 N. J. Eq. 17 (1932).
45. RHODE ISLAND, L. 1947, Ch. 1974, §§ 24-25.
46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(b). Possible example of tax saving through
disclaiming a power of appointment is where elderly surviving spouse's estate is poten-
tially larger than decedent's estate. In regard to life insurance settlement options, see
Rodgers and Sterling, supra note 9 at 225.
47. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2032. In regards to how the election is made, see
§§ 2032(c), 6075(a), 6081. In regards to timely filing see Estate of Downe, 2 T.C. 967
(1943) ; Estate of Doriss, 3 T.C. 219 (1944) ; Estate of Flinchbaugh, I T.C. 653 (1942).
The election may also be made by an amended return. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1 (b) (2).
48. Garrett, Post-Mortem Estate Planning, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1194 (1959).
49. Ibid.
50. FIDUCIARY REVIEW, Sept. 1959, p. 2.
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the effect of increasing the bequest to a surviving spouse where there is a
marital deduction formula clause, with the increased taxes diminishing only
the amount of assets passing to other legatees ;51 and (4) Since, under Sec-
tion 2032(b)(1) and 2055(f)(1) of the Code, the amount of charitable
deduction is also dependent on the valuation date, higher valuation of the
property passing to the charity can result in a lower tax in the estate. 2
It should be remembered that there are two modifications to the general rule
that when the alternate valuation date is chosen, all property included in the
gross estate is valued as of that date. Where property has been distributed,
sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of within the year following death,
it is valued as of the date of such disposition ;53 and where the value or
property is affected by mere lapse of time, it is valued at the date of death,
despite the election of the alternate valuation date.5 4 In exercising the
option to value property at the later date, it must be remembered that the
later date will apply to all property interests forming part of the gross estate
and cannot be applied as to some property interests and excluded as to
others.5 5 If the estate is under $60,000, so that no return need be filed, no
election can be made in a voluntary return in order to obtain a higher income
tax basis than date of death values.50 Although originally intended to pre-
vent the "danger of complete confiscation of estate due to sudden decline in
market values,"57 the availability to the post-mortem estate planner of the
use of alternate valuation date provides another method for the effective
savings on estate as well as income taxation. It is one which should never
be overlooked.
A fifth method which may be utilized is the REDEMPTION OF ELI-
GIBLE GOVERNMENT BONDS to satisfy part or all of the estate tax
due.18 While these bonds will be valued at par for purposes of satisfying the
estate tax, they are only ascribed their fair market value as an asset of the
estate on the appropriate valuation date.59 Substantial savings may be
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032(a) (1).
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032(a) (3).
55. Rosenfield v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 780, aff'd, 254 F.2d 940 (1957). See
also Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(b) (2). A problem which frequently arises where the
alternate valuation date is elected is the very common one of the extent to which income
items are to be included in the gross estate where the alternate valuation date is elected.
See FIDUc. REV., supra note 50, and Price, Alternate Valuation Date Problems, 17th
N. Y. U. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 1245, 1253 (1959).
56. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(b) (1) ; see Rev. Rul. 56-60, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 443.
57. S. REP. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9 (1935).
58. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6312; Treas. Reg. 301.6312; 31 C.F.R. part 306.
59. Banker's Tr. Co. v. United States (D.C.S.D., N.Y., Nov. 5, 1959), 59-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 1 11,913; annot. FIDUCIARY REVIEW, December, 1959.
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achieved in this manner due to the present low cost of acquisition of such
bonds which results in a fairly high effective income return to the purchaser
prior to death. Since only those eligible series that are owned by the decedent
at death and constitute a part of his estate qualify for redemption, acquisition
of such bonds is a matter of lifetime estate planning.60 Some degree of post-
mortem planning is involved, however, for the personal representative must
be careful to deal with the bonds so as to preserve their qualification.6 1
[Editor's note: Subsequent to the submission of this article, the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit has reversed the district court on the
above mentioned method. In Bankers Trust Co., 2 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift
Tax 11 11985, the circuit court stated that the bonds must be given a value
for estate tax purposes of at least par.]
INCOME TAX CONSIDERATIONS
There are also various methods of effecting a post-mortem estate plan
which have a direct effect upon the income tax. Since the scope of this article
is limited, only a brief reference to each will be made. This in no way should
be taken as any indication of the importance of considering income tax con-
sequences in post-mortem estate planning, nor should it foreclose any pos-
sibility of further investigation into the problems and ramifications therein
involved. The following is merely intended to create a basic awareness of
devices which should be considered for income tax savings in the decedent's
last income tax return, the estate's income tax return, the surviving spouse's
return, and the beneficiaries' returns.
Death brings to an end the taxable year of the decedent. The decedent's
final return covers, therefore, the income from the beginning of the taxable
year up to and including the date of death.0 2 It is possible, however, that
two returns may have to be filed by the executor and/or attorney. This will
occur where the decedent dies early in the year without having filed a return
for the prior year. In dealing with the decedent's final income tax return, the
post-mortem estate planner may be presented with an opportunity to effec-
tuate savings through utilization of the following devices.
First, there is a valuable privilege for the personal representative and
surviving spouse to file a JOINT RETURN for that portion of the dece-
dent's taxable year ending with his death and covering the surviving spouse's
60. 31 C.F.R. § 306.28(b).
61. See FIDUCIARY REVIEW, supra note 59 at p. 2 wherein enumerated transactions
where qualification is lost or preserved through various transaction and references to
C.F.R. therein.
62. In regards to when the decedent's final income tax return is due and what
items of income and deductions are to be included in that return see Bowe, Income Tax
Problems of Executors, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 42 (1959).
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entire taxable year.63 The tax advantages of income splitting that a joint
return affords are obvious. 64 Two considerations which may be influential
in a determination to file a joint return are: (1) where a joint return is
employed, an equitable division of liability between the estate and the spouse
must be made;65 (2) since the liability for the tax thereon is joint and sev-
eral, 66 the ability of the surviving spouse to pay a share of the liability should
be ascertained, as should the existence of transactions which might lead to
the assertion of the fraud penalty.67 It should be remembered that if a refund
on the joint return is received for an over-payment of the tax, ownership of
the refund is determined by the conduct of the husband and wife during their
joint lifetime.6 8 Thus, where the husband and wife file a joint declaration of
estimated tax prior to the husband's death, the joint declaration and payment
during their joint lifetime gives rise to an indication of joint ownership to
the right in the refund. This right to the property is held as tenants by the
entireties and passes by right of survivorship to the wife, therefore, forming
no part of the decedent's estate.6 9 On the other hand, failure by the decedent
during his lifetime to elect to file a joint return renders impossible a finding
that the husband has given his wife a joint interest in the refund. Rather,
the refund taxes which initially were withheld from the husband's earnings
remain his individual property, therefore, includable in the decedent's estate.
7 0
63. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2(a), 6013(a) (3),(b) (1). The conditions as stated
by the Regulations at 118, Section 39.51-1(b) and set forth in the code under Section
6013 must be satisfied before the privilege may be exercised.
64. For example, if the calendar year taxpayer dies December 15, 1960, it normally
would be to the executor's advantage to file a joint return with the surviving spouse
for 1960, inasmuch as the income from 1-1 to 12-15, 1960 attributable to the decedent
could have the benefit of the lower brackets found on a joint return. In such case, the
surviving spouse's return would include her entire taxable year. If, however, the dece-
dent died on 1-15, 1961, the only income that would be included in his final return
would be the income from 1-1 to 1-15, 1961. A joint return thus would result in a higher
tax rate on the decedent's income than if separate returns were filed. If a joint return
is nevertheless used, the income of the surviving spouse for the entire year would have
the advantage of the lower joint return brackets.
65. The reason for this rule is that there is always the possibility that those in-
terested in the estate may be damaged unless the estate pays no more than its tax
would have amounted to had the executor filed an individual return. See Rev. Rul.
56-290, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 445 and Rev. Rul. 57-58, 1957-1 CUM BULL. 300 and
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(t) about amount of estate tax deduction for income tax paid
by estate. See also FIDUCIARY REVIEW, July 1959, p. 1.
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(d) (3).
67. Myrna S. Howell, 10 T.C. 859, aff'd 175 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1949), in which
the wife held liable for fraud penalty although the wrongful acts were committed by
her husband.
68. "It is not the Federal authorization for the filing of a joint return by survivor
and personal representative which determines ownership of a refund shown to be due
in such return, but rather the conduct of husband and wife during their joint lifetime."
FIDUCIARY REVIEW, July 1959, p. 2.
69. Green Estate, 8 Fiduc. Rep. 297 (1958).
70. MacNeill Estate, 9 Fiduc. Rep. 386 (1958) ; noted in FIDUCIARY REVIEW, supra
note 68.
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Secondly, if decedent's LIFE INSURANCE is involved, it may be well
to consider the election by the surviving spouse beneficiary of installment pay-
ments to obtain the 1,000 dollars interest exclusion from gross income.
71
Thirdly, where U.S. SAVINGS BONDS are involved, a frequently
overlooked tax saving devise is the exercise of the election to accrue the
interest in decedent's final income tax return.72 If no election is exercised,
income is realized upon the redemption of the bonds measured by the differ-
ence between the cost to decedent and proceeds of the redemption. If the
tax bracket of the decedent's final return is low because of the shortness of
the period, the exemption and deductions, it may be wise to make the elec-
tion in such return to accrue the interest up to that date and have it taxed
at the lower bracket.
The bulk of the income tax problems and savings that will necessitate
close scrutiny by the executor and/or attorney are those which are concerned
with the general scheme of income taxation of an estate. The following
devices should be given careful consideration by the post-mortem estate
planner.
An estate under administration is a separate tax paying entity subject
to the same income tax imposed on an individual.7 3 In general, the income
and deductions are computed in the same manner as for an individual7 4
except that: (1) an estate is entitled to a personal exemption of 600 dollars for
each taxable year, whether a full year or not,75 (2) an estate cannot claim a
standard deduction,7 6 and (3) the charitable deduction is unlimited, but only
for amounts of income paid or set aside according to the will. 77 Therefore,
since the progressive income tax rates of the Code provide advantages in
dividing income among as many legitimate tax entities as possible, it may
be advantageous to PROLONG SETTLEMENT or CONTINUE AD-
MINISTRATION of the estate to utilize the low income brackets afforded
by the additional taxable entity. However, the Code does provide that the
settlement period is the period actually required by the executor to perform
the ordinary duties of administration. 7 Thus, administration cannot be un-
duly prolonged and may be considered terminated for federal income tax
purposes after a final account has been filed, when the assets have been
distributed, when the executor and trustee are one and the same, or when
for any other reason, actions of the executor are no longer essential for the
71. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(d).
72. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 454 (a) ; Fiduciary Review, March 1960, p. 3.
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 641.
74. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 641 (b).
75. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642(b).
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 142(b) (4).
77. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642(c).
78. Treas. Reg. 1.641(b)-3.
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administration of the estate.79 Further, in ascertaining when an estate closes,
the federal taxing authorities will not be bound by determinations of local
probate courts in non-adversary proceedings; each case will be decided in
the light of the Code, Regulations, and previous case histories.8
0
Another device by which substantial savings may be realized exists in
the estates right to CHOOSE ANY FISCAL YEAR it desires, so long as
the period selected ends on the last day of a calendar month, and, in the
first year, is not for a period of more than twelve months.8 Where an un-
usually large income item is received by the estate within the first few months
of administration and the income is not required to be distributed, selection
of a first short year has the effect of keeping the income during that short
period in a lower tax bracket than it would be if that same income were added
to additional income and taxed in a longer first taxable period.8 2 Similarly,
use of the short year at the close of the estate will permit excessive deductions
in the year of termination of an estate to be taken by the beneficiaries on
their individual returns.83 Thus, if the beneficiaries happen to be in a higher
tax bracket than the estate, it will be advantageous to put as many of the
deductions as possible into the last year of the estate. This will have the
effect of enabling the beneficiaries to take advantage of those deductions on
their individual returns. Hence not only will the selection of the fiscal
year permit a leveling of income within tax periods of the estate, but it will
also determine when the beneficiary must include distributions from an estate
in his income.8 4 However, there is always the possibility that estate income
of a longer period than twelve months may be included in a beneficiary's gross
estate, if his tax year is different from the tax year of the estate and if partial
distributions are made. 85
79. See cases and discussion of Camilli, When Estates and Trusts Terminate, 99
TRUSTS & ESTATES 370 (1960).
80. Id. at p. 372.
81. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 441.
82. Further, suppose a decedent died 2-1-60, survived by a widow and no depend-
ents, leaving securities which produce an income of $1,000 a month, the estate terminat-
ing on 12-31-61. For the regular calendar year 2-1-60 to 12-31-60, the $11,000 of estate
income would be taxed at $2,792. For the period 1-1-61 to 12-31-61, the $12,000 of indi-
vidual income would be taxed at $2,792. Total tax due would be $5,584. By choosing a
fiscal year from 2-1-60 to 6-30-60 with $5,000 being taxed at $994 and 7-1-60 to 6-30-61
with $12,000 being taxed at $3,172 to the estate and 7-1-61 to 12-31-61 with $6,000 being
taxed at $1,048 to the individual, a total of $5,164 is due instead of $5,584. See, Price,
supra note 1.
83. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 642(h). There are, however, two exceptions to this
rule. Treas. Reg. 1.642(h)-2 provides that no unused deduction will be allowed for the
personal exemption of Section 642(b) nor the charitable contribution of Section 642(c).
84. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 662(c).
85. For instance, if, in the example at note 82, the estate had distributed the
$12,000 income anytime prior to 6-30-61, the beneficiary would have been taxed on $18,000
in 1961 since income distributed in any taxable year of an estate is taxed in the bene-




An additional method of post-mortem planning which must be considered
in conjunction with the devices heretofore mentioned is that involved in
PLANNED DISTRIBUTIONS. Preliminarily, it should be noted that
opportunities to effect savings through this device are primarily limited to
those estates in which there is no requirement of distribution of income and
all distributions are discretionary. It is only in this situation that the executor
is in a position to make substantial savings in taxes by proper timing of the
distributions from the estate. Mandatory distributions allow no choice as
to whether the income will be taxed to the beneficiary rather than the
estate, irrespective of whether or not there is an actual distribution.86 The
only opportunity to benefit by such mandatory distributions exists in the
choosing of a fiscal period for the estate which will result in the income being
taxed to a beneficiary at the most advantageous time. It should also be noted
that the Code invokes a conduit theory so as to tax all, but no more than all,
of the estate's taxable income either to the estate or to the beneficiaries. It
also provides that an estate is entitled to deduct for income purposes distribu-
tions of property made by it, subject only to the exception that a specific
bequest will not be regarded as deductible by the estate and taxable to the
recipient, thus leaving the estate income taxable to the estate.87 With these
propositions in mind, the following post-mortem estate planning opportunities
should be considered: (1) Distribution of income to beneficiaries whose in-
come tax brackets are lower than that of the estate; (2) Relative merit of
accumulating some or all income for the beneficiaries in higher tax brackets,
thus taxable to the estate and later distributed free of tax to the beneficiaries;
(3) Desirability of making a partial distribution to a beneficiary shortly after
a decedent's death, minimizing the extent of the shift to the higher bracket
distributee by the selection of a short period for the first fiscal year and per-
haps the payment of a portion of administrative expenses in that short period;
(4) Merit in the bunching the payment of administration expenses in that
short final period so that the amount of the expense carry-over to the higher
bracket distributee can be increased; (5) Distribution of sufficient income
to equalize income tax brackets of the joint return where decedent dies in
the early part of the year and considerable income is received by the estate
thereafter; and (6) Distribution of sufficient income so that the taxable
income of the joint return doubles that of the estate's return, causing the top
brackets of both returns to be the same, resulting in the lowest total income
taxation.8 It should be remembered that any distribution during administra-
tion is treated as a distribution of income, to the extent of the estate's dis-
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 661(a) (1) and 662(2) (1).
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 661, 662, 663, 643(a) and 642(3).
88. See Cavitch, How to Time Estate Distributions to Shift Taxes, Avoid Attribu-
tion Complications, 10 J. TAXATION 288 (1958) ; Williams, Picking a Fiscal Year, Tim-
ing and Nature of Distributions, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 16 (1959) ; Price, supra note 1.
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tributable net income, unless it is a payment of a bequest of a specific sum
of money which is distributed in not more than three installments or unless
it is a bequest of specific property.
89
INTER-RELATION BETWEEN THE ESTATE AND INcOME TAX
A third area of estate planning, one which has been referred to as the
"executor's dilemma," 90 evolves about formulating decisions concerning the
elections and discretions of the post-mortem estate planner arising from the
income tax and estate tax. This involves the interplay of various sections
of the Code, all of which have a direct affect on both taxes.
Basically, during the course of administration, a post-mortem estate
planner may have expenses, losses, or payments which can be used as tax
deductions in one of the following ways: (1) for estate tax only, (2) for
income tax only, (3) for both estate tax and income tax, (4) for either
estate tax or income tax, as elected by the executor. The first three types do
not pose problems involving a choice to the executor or persons interested
in the estate. Absent testamentary direction, the executor's duty is pre-
sumably to use his reasonable efforts to make full use of them as deductions.
With regard to certain other expenditures qualifying under the fourth type,91
the executor possesses a right, one which imposes a serious obligation upon
the executor to be certain that he exercise it prudently, to select the method
to be used in deducting expenses for federal tax purposes. 92 After the
executor has determined what expenses are supportable deductions under
both income and estate taxes and are therefore subject to his election, he
faces three questions: (1) the mechanics of exercising and preserving his
right, (2) the tax dollar effects of the alternatives, (3) the effects those
alternatives may have on the distribution of estate income and corpus, and
shifting of tax benefits and burdens among beneficiaries.
89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 663(a) (1).
90. Bronston, Elections and Discretions Under the Code; The Executors Dilemma,
35 TAXES 986 (1957).
91. Generally those expenses under Sections 2053 and 2054 such as administration
expenses, medical and related expenses of last illness paid within one year, etc. are the
ones involved herein. However, it should be noted and remembered, although no
reference in the body herein will be made, that when the beneficiary is also executor or
administrator it would be wise to consider whether he should waive commissions in
writing before undertaking any duties of administration and save personal income tax,
or take commissions and save estate income tax or Federal estate tax. See Rev. Rul.
56-472, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 21.
92. This problem is currently receiving increasing attention. See Cox, Executors
Election to Claim Certain Deductions for Income or Estate Tax Purposes, 20 OHIO ST.
L.J. 23 (1959); Bowe, Income Tax Problems of Executors and Administrators, 32
ROCKY MT. L REv. 66 (1959); Randall, Consequences of Executors Elections as to
Administrative Expenses, 15th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 1011 (1957) ; Sutter, Elec-
tion to Deduct Expenses for Estate or Income Taxes, 3 J. TAXATION 357 (1955)
Bronston, supra note 90; FIDUCIARY REVIEW, Nov. 1958, p. 1.
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The first of these questions presents little difficulty and reference to the
Code provisions is sufficient.93 The second involves many of the methods
discussed under other headings of the paper such as closing the estate, select-
ing a fiscal year, effect on the marital deduction and others. These should
all be considered, as well as a measurement of the comparable tax rates
against the affected tax base. Generally as a result of the election, if the
estate tax goes down, the income tax goes up. Conversely, income taxes
might be saved at the price of an increase of estate tax. Boehm, in an excel-
lent article, sets out two general principles which cover this area :94
Where the maximum marital deduction is not available, assum-
ing sufficient offsetting otherwise taxable net income, in any net
estate up to $100,000 in value, it is always less expensive to use
expenses for income tax purposes than as estate tax deductions.95
and
Where the maximum marital deduction is available in an estate,
assuming sufficient offsetting otherwise taxable net income, in any
full marital deduction up to $2,000,000, it is always less expensive
taxwise to use expenses for income tax purposes in preference to
estate tax deductibility. In most estates, the breaking point may
easily pass $4,000,000.96
Putting it another way, it takes an estate of 1,000,000 dollars to reach a
federal estate tax rate of 39 per cent, whereas income of only 10,000 to
12,000 dollars reaches a comparable rate for federal income tax purposes.
From these it can be concluded that almost all smaller estates, and many
larger ones, will probably require use of the income tax alternative deduction
in preference to reducing the size of the net taxable estate.
In regards to the third question, the exercise of the election may have a
varied effect on beneficiaries. For example, the use of the deductions for
income tax instead of estate tax will increase the amount to which a spouse
would be entitled under a marital deduction formula bequest. 7 If a residu-
ary bequest to a charity is involved, the election to claim the expense as an
income tax deduction will reduce the amount of the charitable deduction
allowable for estate tax purposes.
98
The question arises, then, as to whether or not the executor may act
93. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 642(g), 2053 212 and regulations thereunder. See
also Randall, supra note 92 at 1011 and Cox, supra note 92 at 26.
94. Boehm, Comparing the Relative Tax Costs of Alternative Treatment of Estate
and Income Deductions and Valuation Adjustments, 31 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 172 (1959).
95. Id. at 173.
96. Ibid.
97. Estate of Levy, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957). See Rev. Rul. 55-643,
1955-2 Cum. BULL. 386; Rev. Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 460. For more detailed
discussion of the problems involved see note, Drafting Martial Deduction Provisions,
64 DICK. L. REv. 425 (1960).
98. See example noted in Randall, supra note 92 at 1019, 1020.
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arbitrarily in exercising his election. There is nothing in the federal statute
to guide him in his choice and there is little local law. As pointed out, there
seems to be general agreement that there should be an election of the option
that will produce the least amount of overall tax. The cases have held, how-
ever, that there should then be an equitable allocation of the tax savings be-
tween the various beneficiaries under the will. In a leading article on this
subject the author states:
No court has suggested that the executor is not free to exercise
the choice conferred by Section 6 42(g) with respect to the use of
deductions. Presumably, the executor should, absent contrary in-
structions in the will, exercise the choice for the good of the estate
as a whole. The executor's primary duty in dealing with the deduc-
tions is to keep taxes to a minimum and thus preserve the assets
of the estate.
The local courts have, however, shown concern over the effect
of shift of deductions to the income tax where the will creates trusts.
The most important deductible expenses involved are charges
against principal account. Traditionally, these deductions have been
taken for estate tax purposes. This traditional use also satisfied
concepts of equity; principal account, having borne the expenses,
properly receives the tax benefit flowing from their deductions.
However, if the deductions are shifted to the income tax, principal
account still is charged with the expenses but income account reaps
the tax benefit. The remaindermen are saddled with additional
estate tax and the income beneficiaries receive untaxed income.
The courts of two states have required adjustments in favor
of the remaindermen. Income account must, under these opinions,
reimburse principal account so that the latter is in the position it
would have been if the expenses would have been taken as estate
tax deductions. Any excess of the income tax saving over the estate
tax increase remains with the income beneficiaries. Estate of Ed-
ward H. Warms, 140 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955) Estate of
Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 326, 295 P.2d 68 (1956).9
In Pennsylvania, in a case where the executors elected to claim certain ex-
penses as income tax deductions thereby achieving overall tax savings but
increasing the federal estate tax burden, it was held that an amount equal
to the increase in federal estate tax caused by the election must be trans-
ferred to principal from income and be charged proportionally against the
income beneficiaries. 100 Thus, it seems clear that whenever an election bene-
99. Lewis, Shiftin9 of Deductions from Estate to Income Tax Returns, AB.A,
SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, REPORT OF PROcEEDINGS OF
PROBATE AND TRUST LAW DIVISIONS, 93, 97 (1958).
100. Bell Estate, 7 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 1, aff'd 393 Pa. 623 (1958), annot. FIDUCIARY




fits income at the expense of principal, appropriate adjustments may be
required.
Since the case law on adjustment for the effects of the executor's elec-
tion on competing interests is still in the incipient stage, guideposts and
problems can only be tentative and partially answered. Thus, the following
rules should be considered in a decision to make an appropriate deduction:
(1) A post-mortem estate planner should carefully consider the tax effects
of his deduction election. When possible he should take it where it does the
most good tax-wise. (2) It is not sufficient to weigh the respective tax rates
alone. If there is a formula type of marital trust, there may be, in addition
to the increase in estate tax, a swing of principal from the residuary estate
to the marital share because of the larger adjusted gross income. (3) Receipt
of a benefit should bear its correlative tax burden. The person or account
charged with an expense is entitled to the correlative tax benefit. However,
it seems doubtful that an executor has inherent power to make adjustments,
absent express power in the will.101
In conclusion, it could be said that the modern post-mortem estate
planner's role is difficult as well as important. His task is complicated by
the inter-related provisions of the estate and income taxing statutes. He is
confronted with the duty of working out a plan that will produce the most
favorable tax results for the estate and beneficiaries. He is presented with
a number of alternatives that must be examined and weighed in effectuating
such a plan. This means, as a practical matter, making a great many com-
putations and extensive examination of the law involved. It also may mean
a through awareness of the non-tax considerations which are operative among
the individual beneficiaries. But in the final analysis, it means, and in most
cases to the satisfaction of those involved, effecting substantial tax savings
through post-mortem estate planning.
101. Cox, supra note 92. The author notes that the executor, after having deter-
mined his better election course from practical and economic aspects may: (1) dodge
the problem of adjustment of the effect of the election by deducting the expense on the
return which does not produce distortion at the cost of paying more taxes. But he
points out that such action runs the risk of complaint by estate beneficiaries. (2) Seek
instruction of the probate court. But as pointed out, this may be costly and time con-
suming. (3) Bring together the affected beneficiaries, with their counsel, and seek their
concurrence in the proposed course of election. But Gradwohl, Probate Income Tax,
37 NEB. L. REv. 329 (1958) at 362, note 120, warns, "To the extent that the parties
intentionally engage in a manipulation of income tax which is -later reimbursed by the
benefiting parties, there would appear to be the possibility of added income tax con-
sequences to either the party whose income tax is reimbursed by another, or to the
party whose income tax is paid for him for a fee."
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